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Generally, people respond faster to small numbers with left-sided responses and large 
numbers with right-sided responses, a pattern known as the SNARC (spatial numerical 
association of response codes) effect. The SNARC effect is interpreted as evidence for 
amodal automatic access of magnitude and its spatial associations, as it occurs in settings 
where number is task-irrelevant, and for different number formats. We report five studies 
designed to establish the degree to which activation of magnitude and its spatial associations 
is truly automatic and amodal.  Based on the notion of autonomous automaticity, we 
hypothesised that the mere presence of a number form (to which participants made a color 
decision) would be sufficient to elicit the SNARC effect. However, we found no evidence of 
a SNARC effect for simple color decisions to Arabic digits (Experiment 1). There was a 
SNARC effect for color decision to digits when participants recognised the stimulus as a digit 
before responding (Experiment 2), participants viewed the digit for sufficient time before 
color onset (Experiments 3 and 5), or there was temporal uncertainty regarding color onset 
(Experiment 3). There was no SNARC effect for color decision to arrays of circles 
(Experiment 4), regardless of viewing time or temporal uncertainty. Overall, our results 
suggest that, while access to magnitude and its spatial associations is not automatic in an “all-
or-none” sense, it is certainly at the strong end of automaticity, and that this automatic 
activation is modality dependent. Our findings are most supportive of conceptual coding 
accounts of the SNARC effect. 
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Automaticity of access to numerical magnitude and its spatial associations: the role of task 
and number representation  
What are the processes that underlie our perception of numerical information and our 
understanding of numerical magnitude? One repeated finding that has informed accounts of 
numerical cognition is that people are generally faster to respond to small quantities with a 
left-sided response and to large quantities with a right-sided response; the Spatial Numerical 
Association of Response Codes (or SNARC) effect (Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993; for 
reviews see, e.g., Fischer & Fias, 2005; Gevers & Lammertyn, 2005; van Dijck, Ginsburg, 
Girelli, & Gevers, 2015). This finding strongly suggests that numerical magnitude and space 
are closely associated in human cognition and is consistent with findings from neuroimaging 
that suggest numbers and space are both subserved by structures within the parietal cortex 
(see e.g., Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel, & Dehaene, 2005 for a review); as such, it has been 
influential in the development of models of number processing. For example, when they first 
demonstrated the SNARC effect, Dehaene et al. (1993) attributed it to automatic access of a 
number magnitude representation akin to a “mental number line”. 
 In their original study, Dehaene et al., (1993) asked participants to make parity 
judgements to the digits 0 to 9 using left- and right-hand key presses. However, while the 
SNARC effect is driven by numerical properties, it is not restricted to settings where 
numerical information is directly relevant to the task. For example, Dutch participants who 
were asked to report whether visually presented Arabic digits contained the phoneme /e/ 
using left and right button presses showed a SNARC effect (Fias, Brysbaert, Geypens, & 
d’Ydewalle, 1996). There is also evidence of a SNARC effect for visual detection; Fischer, 
Castel, Dodd, and Pratt (2003) reported that participants responded faster to targets in the left 
visual field after viewing small digits (1 or 2) and faster to targets in the right visual field 
following larger digits (8 or 9). In a free viewing paradigm, Fernández, Rahona, Hervás, 




Vázquez, and Ulrich (2011) found that participants’ first eye movements were influenced by 
the magnitude of a preceding number such that they tended to look left following presentation 
of the numbers 1-4 and right following the presentation of 6-9. As a consequence of such 
findings, the SNARC effect is often described as “automatic”; for example, Fischer et al. 
(2003) concluded that “mere observation of numbers obligatorily activates the spatial 
representations associated with meaning” (p. 556). Likewise, Nuerk, Wood and Willmes 
(2005) reported SNARC effects for auditory number words, visual Arabic numerals, visual 
number words and visual dice patterns and concluded “the SNARC effect indexes the 
existence of an automatic pathway to an amodal semantic magnitude representation” (p.191). 
In a review of the literature, Fias and Fischer (2005) concluded, “a high degree of 
automaticity is involved in the processes that give access to the magnitude representation and 
its spatial association” (p.50).  
  The purpose of the current set of studies is to answer two questions that are 
encapsulated in the quotes above: to what extent is the pathway to magnitude truly automatic, 
and to what extent is it truly amodal? There are many individual SNARC studies that can be 
cited to provide evidence for or against automaticity; however, few of them systematically 
change individual elements of a task to directly compare whether or not it elicits a SNARC 
effect. Furthermore (as discussed below), discussion around automaticity and magnitude have 
generally been framed in an “all-or-none” fashion, when a graded distinction is more useful. 
With regards to the nature of number representation, there are very few studies (to our 
knowledge only one, Bulf, Macchi Cassia & de Hevia, 2014, discussed below) that have 
directly compared non-symbolic non-canonical representations of magnitude with symbolic 
representations of magnitude for SNARC where numerical properties were not relevant to the 
task. As a consequence, in the current series of studies, we aimed to directly compare 
SNARC effects for digits and non-symbolic number in order to establish the degree to which 




numerical representations are automatically accessed upon presentation of numerical 
information, and to establish whether this automaticity is influenced by the form of that 
information. 
Defining automaticity 
 When a process is described as automatic, this gives rise to certain assumptions; for 
example, one might argue that automatic processing should be capacity free, should be 
immune to interruption from other parallel processes, should not rely on attention or 
conscious monitoring, and should occur without the intentional setting of the goal of the 
behaviour (e.g., Ganor-Stern, Tzelgov, & Ellenbogen, 2007; see, Moors & De Houwer, 2006, 
for a thorough analysis of automaticity; see, e.g., Ansari & Besner, 2005, for a discussion of 
automaticity with reference to digit processing). For example, Bargh (1994) listed “four 
horsemen of automaticity” as processes that are efficient, unintentional, uncontrollable and 
unconscious. Under an “all-or-none” approach to automaticity, a process would need to meet 
all of these criteria to meet the definition of automatic, but a more useful way to understand 
cognitive processes is to take a nuanced view of automaticity that is based on its different 
features (see e.g., Bargh, 1992; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Tzelgov & 
Ganor-Stern, 2005; Moors & De Houwer, 2006, for a review). For example, we can draw a 
distinction between processes that are autonomously automatic (i.e., occur regardless of 
whether they are part of the task requirement) and those that are intentionally automatic (i.e., 
processes that occur only when they are part of the task requirement, for detailed discussion 
see, e.g., Cohen Kadosh, Henik, & Rubinsten, 2008; Tzelgov & Ganor-Stern, 2005; Tzelgov, 
Henik, Sneg, & Baruch, 1996).  
The SNARC effect does not fit neatly into either of these definitions. It does not meet 
the criteria for intentional automaticity, as it occurs for tasks where magnitude is not part of 
the task requirement (as in visual detection and phoneme monitoring, Fischer et al., 2003; 




Fias et al., 1996). However, it does not meet the criteria for autonomous automaticity either, 
as it does not appear to occur for all tasks. For example, Zanolie and Pecher (2014) failed to 
replicate Fischer et al.’s (2003) visual detection results; across six experiments, the only 
conditions under which they found a SNARC effect were when participants had to make a 
magnitude decision (whether the digit they had seen was higher or lower than 5) after having 
performed the target detection task. In other words, the effect only arose when the 
participants had to retrieve the magnitude of the digit as part of the task, and Zanolie and 
Pecher concluded that “the mental number line is not activated automatically but at best only 
when it is contextually relevant” (p. 1). Other evidence suggests that the SNARC effect is 
associated with response selection rather than early perceptual processing, which would go 
against a strict interpretation of automaticity. For example, Müller and Schwarz (2007) used 
parity judgements in a psychological refractory period paradigm (see e.g., Pashler, 1994) and 
found that the effect likely arises during response selection rather than during perceptual 
encoding or response execution. This conclusion is backed up by findings in the event-related 
brain potential and lateralised readiness potential literature (e.g., Gevers, Ratinckx, De Baene, 
& Fias, 2006; Otten, Sudevan, Logan, & Coles, 1996).  
Further evidence against strong automaticity comes from the fact that the SNARC 
effect appears to be susceptible to apparently minor differences between tasks. For example, 
Fias, Lauwereyns, & Lammertyn (2001) presented colored digits and shape stimuli 
superimposed onto irrelevant digits; participants were simply asked to respond to the color of 
the digits (Experiments 2 and 3), or to the form (circle versus square, Experiment 5) or 
orientation (triangle pointing upwards or downwards, Experiments 1 and 4) of the 
superimposed shape. Fias et al. found SNARC effects driven by the irrelevant number for 
orientation judgements, but not for color or shape judgements. Lammertyn, Fias and 
Lauwereyns (2002) again compared color decision with orientation decision, this time using 




colored digits and rotated digits; again, they found a SNARC effect for orientation 
judgements but no SNARC effect for color decision. In other words, mere exposure to a digit 
is not necessarily sufficient to prompt access to its semantic representations; other conditions 
or triggers must be present for numerical information to be accessed. 
Moors and De Houwer (2006) argue that, while automaticity is useful as an “umbrella 
term” (p. 321), researchers need to be clear about the sense in which we believe a process to 
be automatic and which individual features of automaticity can be applied to that process. In 
order to do this, we need to establish the set of preconditions that must be in place before a 
process occurs. Currently, the degree of automaticity with which semantic information about 
a number is accessed has yet to be established; researchers have tended to focus on whether 
different tasks trigger the SNARC effect but have not systematically altered aspects of these 
tasks within the same series of experiments. A goal of the current studies was to investigate 
where on the continuum of automaticity the SNARC effect lies; as one of the only tasks for 
which SNARC effects appear not to occur, we therefore chose to use color decision as our 
baseline task. 
(A)modality of magnitude representation 
Numerical information can be represented in a multitude of ways. Fias and Fischer 
(2005) observed that this can include Arabic or Roman symbols, finger positions, dot patterns 
or number words, and noted that “if the SNARC effect indicates access to the abstract 
representation of number magnitude then it should be insensitive to these variations” (p. 47). 
However, as noted in the same volume by Tzelgov and Ganor-Stern (2005), number modality 
and format does appear to matter for some tasks. For example, Cohen Kadosh et al. (2008) 
reported that size congruity effects differed for Arabic and verbal numbers, and argued that 
there should be separate comparison mechanisms for verbal and Arabic numbers in models of 
numerical processing. In their original study, Dehaene et al. (1993) reported that the SNARC 




effect was weaker for verbal numerals rather than Arabic numerals, and argued that the 
representation of number magnitude (or a mental number line) is automatically activated only 
by Arabic numerals. Within the context of Dehaene’s (1992) triple-code model, which 
proposes three concrete representations for number (visual Arabic, auditory verbal, and 
analogue magnitude), they argued that the finding could be accounted for by postulating that 
Arabic-to-analogue transcoding is an automatic process while the verbal-to-analogue 
pathway is weaker.  
Less is known about SNARC effects for non-symbolic, non-canonical number. Nuerk 
et al. (2005) reported SNARC effects for parity decisions to dice patterns; however such 
familiar canonical displays may offer participants a direct route to magnitude information that 
is not present for non-canonical displays, and the task requirement to retrieve parity status 
means that numerical information had to be accessed to perform the task. Patro and Haman 
(2012) and Ebersbach, Luwel, and Verschaffel (2014) found spatial-numerical associations 
with non-symbolic number in children but, again, these tasks required explicit processing of 
magnitude (e.g., indicating which of two plates of sweets had more or fewer sweets, Patro & 
Haman, 2012). Numerical distance effects have been reported for non-symbolic number such 
that people are slower and less accurate to decide which is the larger of two numbers or 
numerosities that are close (e.g., 2 items vs. 3 items) than when the distance is greater (e.g., 2 
vs. 8; Moyer & Landauer, 1967), and it has been argued that such effects are driven by spatial 
associations with number; however, again, this is a task that requires explicit reasoning about 
magnitude. To our knowledge, there are only two reports of a SNARC effect for non-
symbolic, non-canonical number when magnitude is task-irrelevant. The first was reported by 
Mitchell, Bull and Cleland (2012), who asked participants to indicate with left- and right-
hand key presses whether arrays of one-to-nine triangles were presented pointing upwards or 
downwards. However, this finding has yet to be replicated. The second was based on Fischer 




et al.’s (2003) visual detection task; Bulf et al. (2014) presented participants with either the 
digits 2 or 9, or with two or nine circles presented centrally on a screen. This was then 
followed by a to-be-detected target presented on either the left or right of the screen. For both 
representations, participants were faster to detect a target on the right following larger 
numerical magnitudes and the left following smaller numerical magnitudes. Based on this 
finding, we would expect to see similar SNARC effects for digits and for arrays of objects. 
However, as noted above, others have failed to replicate the SNARC effect for visual 
detection with digits (Zanolie & Pecher, 2014). Furthermore, we know of no studies that 
directly compare performance on the same SNARC task for symbolic and non-symbolic, 
non-canonical information when semantic information about the number was irrelevant to the 
task and left- and right-handed responses are required.  
The current studies 
The current studies were designed to test two hypotheses about the SNARC effect: (1) 
that it reflects an automatic pathway to magnitude, and (2) that the representation of 
magnitude and its spatial association is amodal. In order to do this, we focussed on the color 
decision task for both digit and non-symbolic number, where participants were simply asked 
to indicate whether the stimulus on the screen was blue or green by making key presses with 
their left and right hands. In Experiments 1 and 2, we first investigated (1) whether we would 
replicate the null finding for SNARC effects for color decision to digits, and (2) whether the 
requirement to recognize the stimulus as a number prior to responding would be enough to 
trigger the SNARC effect. In Experiment 1, participants made color decisions to digits and 
Greek letters presented on a computer screen. Based on the findings of Fias et al. (2001), we 
expected there to be no SNARC effect for this task. However, in Experiment 2, we included 
an inhibitory go / no-go element to the task such that participants made color decisions to 
digits but withheld responses to the Greek letters. This manipulation meant that the 




participants had to recognise the stimulus as a number before proceeding to the color 
decision task. If we assume that simply recognising something as a number is enough to 
trigger access to the semantic associations with that number, we would predict a SNARC 
effect for this task. An analysis of the data from Experiment 2 was previously reported in 
another paper in the context of assessing whether or not different studies demonstrated a sex 
difference in spatial associations with number (Bull, Cleland, & Mitchell, 2013); however it 
was originally run as part of the current series of experiments and we report further detail and 
additional analyses here.  
Following the finding of a SNARC effect in Experiment 2 (but not Experiment 1), our 
next step was to establish whether simple color decision could trigger a SNARC effect if we 
altered the timing of stimulus presentation to increase digit viewing time. To this end, in 
Experiments 3 and 4 we introduced three color onset conditions (0 ms, 200 ms, and 400 ms). 
In the 0 ms condition the stimuli were blue or green when they appeared on the screen, in the 
200 ms condition the stimuli were presented in black for 200 ms prior to color onset, and in 
the 400 ms condition they were presented in black for 400 ms. The onset conditions were 
mixed across the experimental session. This tested the hypothesis that magnitude and its 
spatial associations are accessed automatically but relatively slowly. In Experiment 3, 
participants made their responses to digits, but in Experiment 4, we presented arrays of one to 
nine circles. This allowed us to test the hypothesis that the automaticity of SNARC effects 
should be similar regardless of the form of magnitude representation; if the SNARC effect is 
unaffected by the form of numerical representation, then we would expect the same pattern of 
results to occur across Experiments 3 and 4 regardless of the form of the numerical 
information. In fact, we found that participants showed a significant SNARC effect when 
responding to digits in Experiment 3, but no evidence of a SNARC effect when responding to 
arrays of circles in Experiment 4. Finally, in order to distinguish the role of temporal 




uncertainty regarding color onset versus digit viewing time, in Experiment 5, the 0 ms, 200 
ms, and 400 ms conditions were blocked rather than mixed. If temporal uncertainty alone 
drove the SNARC effect in Experiment 3, we would expect to see no SNARC effect in 
Experiment 5; if viewing a digit for sufficient time played a role in eliciting the SNARC 
effect, we would expect to see no SNARC effect for the 0 ms condition, but a SNARC effect 
for the 200 ms and 400 ms conditions. 
 
Experiments 1 and 2 
Method 
Participants. Forty participants (20 men, mean age 20.39 years, SD = 2.98) took part 
in Experiment 1 and 40 participants (20 men, mean age 21.58 years, SD = 5.84) took part in 
Experiment 2. All were either undergraduate or graduate students recruited on a voluntary 
basis or for course credit. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All studies received 
ethics committee approval from the School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen. 
Stimuli and Procedure.  
Stimuli. In both experiments, the stimuli were blue and green digits (1-9, excluding 5) 
and Greek letters (Ω, Φ, β, δ, ζ, λ, ξ, and φ, simply described as “symbols” to the participants) 
presented onscreen in Arial font size 36.  
Experiment 1 procedure. Participants were instructed that, on each trial (regardless of 
whether they saw a digit or a symbol), they should indicate whether the stimulus was 
presented in blue or green. Half of the participants responded to blue stimuli with the M key 
and green stimuli with the Z key; for the other half the response mapping was reversed. On 
each trial, a fixation cross was presented centrally for 1000 ms. This was then replaced by 
either a symbol or digit, which remained onscreen for 1500 ms or until the participant made a 
response. This was followed by a blank screen for 1000 ms before the fixation point for the 




next trial. The experimental session consisted of 240 trials in total; 192 of these were digit 
trials (24 presentations of each digit, 12 green and 12 blue), and 48 were symbol trials. The 
main experimental session was preceded by a practice block of 24 trials (16 digit trials and 8 
symbol trials), with feedback on response time and accuracy. There was no feedback during 
the main experimental block. The experimental stimuli were presented on a Dell 19” flat 
panel monitor using a Dell PC running Windows XP, with key presses recorded from a Dell 
keyboard. Reaction times were collected using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). 
Experiment 2 procedure. In Experiment 2, participants were instructed that if they 
saw a digit, they should indicate whether it was presented in blue or green. However, they 
were also instructed that they should withhold their response if the stimulus was a symbol. In 
all other aspects, the procedure was identical to Experiment 1. 
Results 
In all experiments, reaction times for each digit responded to with the left and right 
key were collated and the median time calculated (correct responses only). The difference in 
the time to respond to each digit with the right and left hand was then calculated (right hand 
RT – left hand RT). If there is a SNARC effect, then we would expect responses to smaller 
digits to be faster with the left hand than with the right hand, yielding a positive value when 
the reaction time for the left hand is subtracted from the reaction time for the right hand. At 
the other end of the scale, responses to larger numbers should be faster with the right hand, 
yielding a negative value when the reaction time for the left hand is subtracted. As a result, 
plotting the reaction time differences against number should yield a negative going slope. In 
order to quantify this, the nature of the SNARC effect was captured by regression analyses 
(Lorch & Myers, 1990, Method 3; for a detailed discussion, see Fias, Brysbaert, Geypens, & 
d’Ydewalle, 1996). A regression equation was computed for each participant, with digit 




magnitude as the predictor variable and reaction time difference as the criterion variable. In 
the absence of a SNARC effect, the reaction time difference across the digits should remain 
relatively constant and the regression weight (standardised β) should not differ significantly 
from 0. In the presence of a SNARC effect, we would expect to see a negative regression 
weight that does differ significantly from 0. As such, the regression weight was recorded for 
each participant, and a one-sample t-test conducted to determine whether the regression 
weights across participants differed significantly from 0 (a flat line). The mean response time 
differences for both experiments are displayed in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Mean reaction time difference for each digit for color decision in Experiment 1 
(Blue/green: participants made color decisions on all trials), and Experiment 2 (Go / no-go, 
participants only responded to digits). Errors bars show +/- 1 standard error. The shaded area 
shows the 95% confidence interval for the trend line. All graphs were generated using ggplot 
2 (Wickham, 2009) in R (R Core Team, 2016). 
 




Experiment 1 Results. The mean error rate was 4.22%, with trials on which an error 
occurred excluded from the analysis. The mean reaction time for correct trials was 447 ms 
(mean reaction times across all studies are listed in Table 1).  
There was no evidence of a SNARC effect; a one-sample t-test revealed that the 
regression weight did not differ significantly from 0, mean β = -.013, t (39) = -.224, p = .824, 
d = .035, 95% CI [-.133, .107]. Given that we are reporting null findings, we additionally ran 
a Bayesian one-sample t-test using a Cauchy prior width of .707 (see, e.g., Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) using JASP software (JASP team, 2018). This 
yielded a Bayes Factor (BF10) of 0.175, suggesting moderate evidence for the null hypothesis. 
We report Bayes Factors for the remaining t-tests in the paper, using the same Cauchy prior 
width in all cases. 
A reviewer (Marc Brysbaert) suggested that we check whether a MARC effect 
(markedness association of response codes) masked an underlying SNARC effect in our data. 
To briefly summarise, the MARC effect refers to the fact that odd numbers are typically 
responded to faster with the left hand and even numbers with the right hand (e.g., Berch, 
Foley, Hill, & Ryan, 1999; Nuerk, Iversen, & Willmes, 2004; Reynvoet & Brysbaert, 1999). 
Importantly, the MARC effect has been shown to interfere with the SNARC effect (e.g., 
Berch et al., 1999; Zohar-Shai, Tzelgov, Karni, & Rubinsten, 2017). In order to rule out this 
possibility, we ran additional analyses in Experiment 1 to examine whether there was a 
MARC effect in our data. Following Zohar-Shai et al., we calculated median reaction time 
for each hand, and ran a repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with hand (left 
versus right), magnitude (1-2 versus 3-4 versus 6-7 versus 8-9) and parity (1-3-5-7 versus 2-
4-6-8) as factors. There was a main effect of response hand, F (1, 39) = 13.986, p < .001, 
MSE = 2124, 2pη = .264, with responses for the left hand (455 ms) slower than responses with 
the right hand (442 ms). However, there were no other main effects or interactions. In 




particular, there was no reaction time difference between responses to odd (448 ms) and even 
(449 ms) numbers, and there was no interaction of parity by response hand, F (1, 39) = .335, 
p = .566, MSE = 992, 2pη  = .009 . In other words, there was no evidence that an underlying 
SNARC effect was being masked by a MARC effect. 
 Experiment 2 Results. The mean error rate for “go trials” (i.e., color decision to 
digits) was 4.8% and for “no-go trials” (i.e., withheld responses to Greek letter trials) was 
1.5%. The mean reaction time for correct trials was 511 ms. A one-sample t-test revealed that 
the regression weight differed significantly from 0, mean β = -.245, t (39) = -3.38, p = 0.002, 
d = 0.534, CI[-.391, -.098], BF10 = 19.486, indicating strong evidence against the null 
hypothesis. 
 As in Experiment 1, we additionally ran a repeated measures ANOVA with hand (left 
versus right), magnitude (1-2 versus 3-4 versus 6-7 versus 8-9) and parity (1-3-7-9 versus 2-
4-6-8) as factors. This revealed a significant interaction of response hand by magnitude, F (3, 
117) = 4.60, p = .004, MSE = 3058, 2pη = .105. As one would expect given the significant 
SNARC effect in the regression analyses, reaction times for the left hand generally became 
slower with magnitude bin (509 ms for 1-2, 513 ms for 3-4, 524 ms for 6-7, and 523 ms for 
8-9), while reaction times for the right hand generally became faster (532 ms for 1-2, 518 ms 
for 3-4, 510 ms for 6-7, and 507 ms for 8-9). However, no other effects were significant. In 
particular, there was no interaction of response hand by parity, F (1, 39) = 1.137, p = .293, 
MSE = 2130, 2pη  = .028. As we did not find evidence of a MARC effect masking the SNARC 
effect across the remaining studies, we do not report any further MARC analyses. 
 
Table 1. Mean reaction times (ms), standard deviations and presence of SNARC effect across 
all experiments. 




Experiment Mean reaction 
time (SD) 
SNARC effect 
Experiment 1 – Color decision 447 ms (66) No 
Experiment 2 – Go / no-go color decision 511 ms (92) Yes 
Experiment 3 – Color decision to digits (mixed stimulus onset) 
0 ms color onset 474 ms (52) Yes 
200 ms color onset 428 ms (43) Yes 
400 ms color onset 419 ms (47) Yes 
Experiment 4 – Color decision to circles (mixed stimulus onset) 
0 ms color onset 466 ms (65) No 
200 ms color onset 427 ms (66) No 
400 ms color onset 414 ms (55) No 
Experiment 5 – Color decision to digits (blocked stimulus onset) 
0 ms color onset 427 ms (69) No 
200 ms color onset 418 ms (51) Yes 
400 ms color onset 420 ms (60) Yes 
 
Discussion  
 There was no SNARC effect for simple color decisions to digits in Experiment 1, a 
finding consistent with Fias et al. (2001) and Lammertyn et al. (2002). However, when the 
task required participants to recognise the stimulus as a digit prior to making a response (in 
Experiment 2), there was a significant SNARC effect. The simplest explanation for this 
pattern of findings relates to the depth to which the stimulus must be processed in order to 
complete the task. While a straightforward color decision does not require access to any 
information about the digit, the requirement to recognise the stimulus as a digit in Experiment 




2 was enough to trigger access to magnitude and its associated semantic information. Taken 
together, these results would suggest that at least some requirement to process numerical 
information (but not necessarily magnitude) is required to trigger the SNARC effect. This 
need not be so substantial as its parity status, but it does require at least recognition that the 
stimulus represents numerical information. 
The differences between Experiment 1 and 2 are not limited to the recognition of the 
digit, however. Most obviously, Experiment 2 involves a more complex task than Experiment 
1, and this is reflected in the reaction times; reaction times in Experiment 1 (447 ms) were 
significantly faster than Experiment 2 (511 ms), t (78) = 3.61, p < .001, d = .807, CI[-
100.041, -28.909]. It is therefore possible that the simple color decision required in 
Experiment 1 was so easily and rapidly executed that it did not allow enough time for 
activated semantic information associated with the digit to impact on the pattern of response 
times.   
There also remains the question of why at least one study in the literature has reported 
a positive SNARC finding for color decision; Hoffmann, Hornung, Martin, & Schiltz (2013) 
found a SNARC effect for color decision in children with a mean age of 5.84 years. This is a 
surprising finding given that other studies have not found an effect for color decision in 
adults, and also because other studies in children have found that the SNARC effect emerges 
at a later age in other tasks (e.g., Berch et al., 1999; van Galen & Reitsma, 2008; although cf. 
Yang et al., 2014). Indeed, Hoffmann et al. did not find a SNARC effect for magnitude 
decision in the same participants, and it is odd that the same children would show a SNARC 
effect for color (where magnitude is irrelevant to the task) but not for magnitude decisions 
(where magnitude clearly is relevant to the task). The key difference between Hoffmann et 
al.’s study and those run with adults (i.e., Fias et al., 2001; Lammertyn et al., 2002; 
Experiment 1 of the current studies) was that Hoffmann et al. displayed the digit in black for 




200 ms before color onset. As such, it may be that viewing time is important in determining 
whether or not a SNARC effect occurs. In order to investigate this possibility, in Experiments 
3 and 4 we introduced three color onset conditions. 
Given the finding from Experiment 2 that SNARC effects can occur for color decision 
to digits, we additionally investigated whether the same could be true for other 
representations of magnitude. In Experiment 4, we presented participants with arrays of 
between one and nine circles, but manipulated the onset of color. If the SNARC effect really 
does index the existence of an automatic pathway to an amodal semantic representation, then 
we would predict that, whatever the pattern of SNARC effects cross the SOAs, it should be 
similar for digits and non-symbolic displays of numerosity. 
In Experiment 3, participants made color decisions to digits with three onset 
conditions (0 ms, 200 ms and 400 ms). In the 0 ms onset condition, the digits appeared blue 
or green on the screen and participants responded to the color. However, in the 200 ms onset 
and 400 ms onset conditions, the digits appeared in black for 200 ms and 400 ms respectively 
before changing color. In Experiment 4, the procedure was exactly the same except that 
arrays of one to nine circles were displayed instead of digits. 
Experiments 3 and 4 
Method 
 Participants. Twenty participants (10 men, mean age 22.60 years, SD = 2.80) took 
part in Experiment 3 and twenty participants (12 men, mean age 21.30 years, SD = 1.78) took 
part in Experiment 4. All were undergraduate students recruited on a voluntary basis. All had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 Stimuli, Design and Procedure.  
 Experiment 3 stimuli. The stimuli were black, blue and green digits (1-9, excluding 5) 
presented onscreen in Arial font size 36. There were three conditions; 0 ms color onset (the 




digit appeared in either blue or green), 200 ms color onset (the digit appeared in black for 200 
ms before changing to either blue or green), and 400 ms color onset (the digit appeared in 
black for 400 ms before changing to either blue or green).  
 Experiment 4 stimuli. The stimuli were arrays of black, blue and green circles (1-9, 
excluding 5, presented onscreen). The total surface area of the circles in each array was 452 
mm2, with the surface area of individual circles varied within this. As with Experiment 3, 
there were three conditions; 0 ms color onset (the array of circles appeared in either blue or 
green), 200 ms color onset (the circles appeared in black for 200 ms before changing to either 
blue or green), and 400 ms color onset (the circles appeared in black for 400 ms before 
changing to either blue or green). An example of the stimuli used in Experiment 4 is shown in 
Figure 2. 
 Experiment 3 Design and Procedure. Participants were instructed that they should 
indicate whether the digit was presented in blue or green. Half of the participants responded 
to blue stimuli with the M key and green stimuli with the Z key; for the other half, the 
response mapping was reversed. In the 0 ms onset condition, on each trial a fixation cross 
was presented centrally for 1000 ms, and was then replaced by a blue or green digit, which 
remained onscreen for 2000 ms or until the participant made a response. This was followed 
by a blank screen for 1000 ms before the fixation point for the next trial. In the 200 ms onset 
condition, the sequence was identical except that after the fixation cross, the digit appeared in 
black for 200 ms before changing to either blue or green. In the 400 ms onset condition, the 
digit appeared in black for 400 ms before changing to either blue or green.  
 The experimental session consisted of 384 trials in total split across four blocks; each 
digit appeared 48 times, and 16 times in each onset condition. The presentation order of the 
digits and the onset conditions was randomised such that each block contained a mix of 
stimulus onsets. The experimental blocks were preceded by a practice block of 12 trials, with 




feedback on accuracy and reaction time. There was no feedback during the experimental 
blocks. The experimental stimuli were presented on a Dell 19” flat panel monitor using a Dell 
PC running Windows 7, with key presses recorded from a Dell keyboard. Reaction times 
were collected using E-Prime 2.0 software. 
 Experiment 4 Design and Procedure. The design and procedure for Experiment 4 was 
identical to Experiment 3 in all aspects other than that the participants were told that they 
would be responding to the color of arrays of circles.  
 
Figure 2. The time course of stimulus presentation in Experiment 4. In the 0 ms condition, 
the array of circles appeared immediately as either green or blue. In the 200 ms and 400 ms 
condition (pictured), the array of circles appeared in black first and then changed to green or 
blue 200 ms or 400 ms later. The stimulus pictured is a nine-circle array. 
Results 




 Experiment 3 Results. The mean error rate was 3.21%. The mean reaction time 
across the conditions was 440 ms. A one-sample t-test revealed that, collapsed across all 
onset conditions, the regression weight differed significantly from 0, mean β = -.347, t (19) = 
-4.223, p < .001, d = .944, 95% CI [-.519, -.175], BF10 = 71.979. This remained true for each 
of the onset conditions when considered separately; 0 ms onset, mean β = -.275, t (19) = -
3.054, p = .007, d = .683, 95% CI [-.464, -.087], BF10 = 7.320, 200 ms onset, mean β = -.310, 
t (19) = -4.003, p < .001, d = .895, 95% CI [-.472, -.148], BF10 = 46.441, and the 400 ms 
onset, mean β = -.258, t (19) = -3.126, p = .006, d = .699, 95% CI [-.431, -.085], BF10 = 
8.373. A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed no significant effect of 
color onset (0 ms versus 200 ms versus 400 ms) on the regression weight, F (2,38) = .107, 
MSE = .130, p = .898, 2pη  = .006. The mean response time differences across conditions are 
displayed in Figure 3.  
 




Figure 3. Mean reaction time difference for each digit for color decision in Experiment 3 for 
the 0 ms, 200 ms, and 400 ms color onset conditions. Errors bars show +/- 1 standard error. 
The shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval for the trend line. 
 
 A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that color onset (0 ms versus 200 ms versus 
400 ms) had a significant effect on reaction times, F (2,38) = 89.264, MSE = 190.708, p 
<.001, 2pη  = .825. Pairwise comparisons revealed that this was because the mean reaction 
time for the 0 ms onset condition (474 ms, SD = 52) was significantly slower than the 
reaction time for the 200 ms onset condition (428 ms, SD = 43), p < .001, which was 
significantly slower than the reaction time for the 400 ms onset condition (419 ms, SD = 47), 
p = .035. 
 Experiment 4 Results. The mean error rate was 6.03%. The mean reaction time 
across the conditions was 436 ms. A one-sample t-test revealed that the regression weight did 
not differ significantly from 0 across the conditions, mean β = .038, t (19) = .426, p = .675, d 
= .095, 95% CI [-.149, 0.226], BF10 = 0.252. This remained true for each of the onset 
conditions when considered separately; 0 ms onset, mean β = -.10, t (19) = -1.101, p = .285, d 
= .246, 95% CI [-.29, .09], BF10 = 0.396, 200 ms onset, mean β = -.093, t (19) = -.983, p = 
.338, d = .220, 95% CI [-.291, .105], BF10 = 0.356, and the 400 ms onset, mean β = -.026, t 
(19) = -.283, p = .780, d = .063, 95% CI [-.215, .164], BF10 = 0.241. A repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed no significant effect of color onset (0 ms versus 200 
ms versus 400 ms) on the regression weight, F (2,38) = .202, MSE = .166, p = .602, 2pη  = 
.015. The mean response time differences across conditions are displayed in Figure 4.  
 





Figure 4. Mean reaction time difference for each numerosity for color decision in Experiment 
4 for the 0 ms, 200 ms, and 400 ms color onset conditions. Errors bars show +/- 1 standard 
error. The shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval for the trend line. 
 
 A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that color onset (0 ms versus 200 ms versus 
400 ms) had a significant effect on mean RTs, F (2,38) = 47.67, MSE = 310.95, p <.001, 2pη  
= .715. Pairwise comparisons revealed that this was because the mean reaction time for the 0 
ms onset condition (466 ms, SD = 65) was significantly slower than the reaction time for the 
200 ms onset condition (427 ms, SD = 66), p < .001, which was significantly slower than the 
reaction time for the 400 ms onset condition (414 ms, SD = 55), p = .040. 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 3, there was a SNARC effect for color decision regardless of the 
stimulus onset. Indeed, the β-weight for the 0 ms onset (-.275) was similar to the 200 ms 
onset (-.310) and 400 ms onset (-.258). However, the mean reaction time across the different 




conditions did vary, with reaction times to the 0 ms condition (474 ms) slower than the 
reaction times to the 200 ms and 400 ms conditions (428 ms and 419 ms respectively, see 
Table 1). In contrast, there was no evidence whatsoever of a SNARC effect for color decision 
to non-symbolic number in Experiment 4, despite the fact that the mean reaction times across 
the conditions were very similar to those in Experiment 5 (466 ms, 427 ms, and 414 ms for 
the 0 ms, 200 ms, and 400 ms conditions respectively, see Table 1). Our results are consistent 
with the conclusion that the form of number representation is important in determining 
whether or not the SNARC effect occurs; this will be considered in detail in the General 
Discussion. 
 The increase in reaction time for the 0 ms condition is likely due to the temporal 
uncertainty of the color onset; indeed, the reaction time pattern is reminiscent of the fore-
period effect where reaction times are longer when the interval between a warning stimulus 
and an imperative stimulus is shorter (Woodrow, 1914; see e.g., Los, 2010 for a review); 
however note that foreperiod effects occur over a longer time frame (in the order of seconds 
rather than hundreds of milliseconds). It seems likely that temporal uncertainty has 
introduced an element of inhibition to the task; over the course of the experiment, participants 
must suppress the urge to respond immediately upon seeing the digit because on two-thirds of 
the trials they will not be able to make a response. Whether because of the inhibitory 
component, or purely because their reaction times are slower, this triggers a SNARC effect in 
the 0 ms condition for digits. More informatively, the reaction times to the 200 ms and 400 
ms onset conditions in Experiment 3 (as timed from color onset), were faster than reaction 
times in Experiment 1 for simple color decision (428 ms and 419 ms respectively versus 447 
ms). Despite the speed with which participants were able to perform the color task in these 
conditions, they still showed a SNARC effect.  




 The finding of a SNARC effect for color decision in Experiment 3 is consistent with 
Hoffmann et al.’s (2013) SNARC finding in children, but the mixed presentation of onset 
conditions means that it is difficult to know the relative contribution of viewing time versus 
uncertainty around color onset. In order to address this, in Experiment 5 participants again 
made color decisions to digits in the 0 ms, 200 ms and 400 ms color onset conditions. 
However, the conditions were now blocked according to color onset. In other words, every 
participant completed a block of 0 ms onset trials, a block of 200 ms onset trials, and a block 
of 400 ms onset trials (with the order counterbalanced across participants). If the SNARC 
effect observed in Experiment 3 was triggered by temporal uncertainty, we would expect to 
see no SNARC effect in any of the blocks in Experiment 5. However, following the 
hypothesis that viewing time was important, we hypothesised that we would find no SNARC 
effect in the 0 ms condition, but a significant SNARC effect in the 200 ms and 400 ms 
conditions. As there was no SNARC effect observed across any of the conditions in 
Experiment 4, we did not run a parallel study using arrays of circles. 
Experiment 5 
Method 
 Participants. As we were potentially interested in block order as well as the effect of 
onset condition, and in order to counterbalance block order completely, we increased the 
number of participants in Experiment 5. Eighty-four participants (16 men, mean age 20.77 
years, SD = 2.87) took part. All were undergraduate students recruited on a voluntary basis. 
All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 Stimuli, Design and Procedure. The stimuli were identical to Experiment 3. As in 
Experiments 3 and 4, there were three color onset conditions; 0 ms color onset (the digit 
appeared in either blue or green), 200 ms color onset (the digit appeared in black for 200 ms 
before changing to either blue or green), and 400 ms color onset (the digit appeared in black 




for 400 ms before changing to either blue of green). However, unlike in Experiments 3 and 4, 
the presentation of these conditions was blocked such that each participants saw three blocks 
(0 ms color onset, 200 ms color onset, and 400 ms color onset) with the order of block 
presentation counterbalanced across participants. 
 Participants were instructed that they should indicate whether the digit was presented 
in blue or green. Half of the participants responded to blue stimuli with the M key and green 
stimuli with the Z key; for the other half, the response mapping was reversed. The 
experimental session consisted of three blocks of 128 trials; within each block, each digit 
appeared 16 times (eight times in green and eight times in blue). One block had a color onset 
of 0 ms for all trials, one had a color onset of 200 ms and the other had a color onset of 400 
ms. The order of these blocks was counterbalanced across participants; as there were six 
possible block orders (0-200-400, 0-400-200, 200-0-400, 200-400-0, 400-0-200, 400-200-0), 
each potential block order was seen by 14 participants. The experimental sessions were 
preceded by a practice session of 12 trials with four 0 ms color onset trials, four 200 ms color 
onset trials, and four 400 ms color onset trials presented sequentially. In the practice block, 
participants were given feedback on accuracy and reaction time but there was no feedback in 
the experimental blocks. Prior to the practice session, participants were told “in some blocks 
of the experiment, the number will appear in black before changing color. You should wait 
until it changes color before making your response. In other blocks the number will just 
appear as blue or green immediately. You will see examples of both types of trial in the 
practice session, but in the experiment itself you will only see one type of trial in each block”. 
The participants were not told prior to each block which condition they would be seeing. The 
experimental stimuli were presented on a Dell 19” flat panel monitor using a Dell PC running 
Windows 7, with key presses recorded from a Dell keyboard. Reaction times were collected 
using E-Prime 2.0 software. 





 The mean error rate was 3.38%. The mean reaction time was 423 ms. A one-sample t-
test revealed that, collapsed across all conditions, the regression weight differed significantly 
from 0, mean β = -.200, t (83) = -5.019, p < .001, d = .548, CI [-.279, -.121], BF10 = 
5279.647. However, when considered separately, there was a significant effect for the 200 ms 
onset, mean β = -.126, t (83) = -2.879, p = .005, d = .314, CI [-.213, -.039], BF10 = 5.554, and 
the 400 ms onset, mean β = -.238, t (83) = -6.56, p < .001, d = .716, CI [-.310, -.166], BF10 = 
2.562e+6. but not the 0 ms onset, mean β = -.068, t (83) = -1.41, p = .162, d = .154, CI [-.163, 
.028], BF10 = .312. Indeed, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of color 
onset, F (2, 166) = 4.249, MSE = .147, p = .016, 2pη = .049. Pairwise comparisons revealed 
that the SNARC effect for the 400 ms condition (-.238) was significantly greater than for the 
0 ms condition (-.068), p = .015. In order to assess whether the lack of a SNARC effect in the 
0 ms block was influenced by block order, we ran a one-way ANOVA on the 0 ms color 
onset condition with block (first versus second versus third) as a factor. The SNARC effect 
for the 0 ms block did not vary depending on block order, F (2, 81) = .118, p = .889. The 
mean β-weight for the 0 ms condition when it was the first block was -.096, when it was 
second it was -.070 and when it was third it was -.038. The mean response time differences 
across conditions are presented in Figure 5.  





Figure 5. Mean reaction time difference for each digit for color decision in Experiment 5 for 
the 0 ms, 200 ms, and 400 ms color onset conditions. Error bars show +/1 standard error. The 
shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval for the trend line. 
  
 A repeated measures ANOVA on mean reaction times revealed no effect of color 
onset condition, F (2,166) = 2.446, MSE = 739.161, p = .090, 2pη = .029. The mean reaction 
time for the 0 ms condition was 427 ms, for the 200 ms condition it was 418 ms, and for the 
400 ms condition it was 420 ms.  
Discussion 
 In Experiment 5, we found a mixed pattern of SNARC effects for digits; participants 
showed a SNARC effect in the 200 ms and 400 ms onset conditions, but not in the 0 ms onset 
block. This was despite the fact that (unlike in Experiments 3 and 4 when onset was mixed), 
the mean reaction time to the colored digit did not differ significantly across the conditions. 
Our results are consistent with the conclusion that the act of viewing the digit for 200 ms or 




400 ms before making a response is sufficient to trigger magnitude information associated 
with that digit, and hence its spatial associations. Furthermore, they are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the SNARC effect for the 0 ms condition in Experiment 3 was triggered by 
the temporal uncertainty of color onset. 
General Discussion 
 The current set of experiments was designed to investigate the extent to which 
magnitude information and its spatial associations are automatically accessed upon 
presentation of numerical information, and whether the form of that numerical information 
matters. To summarise, we found no evidence of a SNARC effect for simple color decisions 
to digits (Experiment 1, and the 0 ms onset condition in Experiment 5). However, we did find 
a SNARC effect when participants had to recognise a stimulus as a digit prior to responding 
to the color (Experiment 2). Additionally, we found a SNARC effect for color decision to 
digits when the participant viewed the digit for 200 ms or more before color onset 
(Experiments 3 and 5), or if there was temporal uncertainty regarding the onset of color 
(Experiment 3). We observed no evidence of a SNARC effect for color decisions to non-
symbolic representations of number, regardless of how long the participant viewed the 
stimulus before color onset, or whether there was temporal uncertainty regarding color onset 
(Experiment 4). There did not appear to be an obvious relationship between the speed of 
participants’ responding and the presence or absence of the SNARC effect (see Table 1).  
Automaticity of the SNARC effect for symbolic number 
The SNARC effect has been discussed in terms of both ends of what we might call the 
automaticity spectrum. To return to the examples in the Introduction, we can contrast 
statements such as “mere observation of numbers obligatorily activates the spatial 
representations associated with meaning” (Fischer et al., 2003, p. 556) with “the mental 
number line is not activated automatically but at best only when contextually relevant” 




(Zanolie & Pecher, 2014, p. 1). In reality, our findings suggest that neither of these statements 
are strictly true. These two examples map nicely onto the distinction we drew in the 
Introduction between autonomous and intentional automaticity (e.g., Cohen Kadosh et al., 
2008; Tzelgov & Ganor-Stern, 2005; Tzelgov et al., 1996); to reiterate briefly, processes that 
are autonomously automatic occur regardless of whether they are part of the task requirement 
and processes that are intentionally automatic occur only when they are part of the task 
requirement. The findings of the current studies suggest that activation of magnitude 
information and its spatial associations falls somewhere between these two possibilities (at 
least, for symbolic representations of number); certainly, it does not meet the strictest 
requirements of autonomous automaticity as it does not occur for color decisions under the 
most straightforward circumstances (simple binary color decisions). It meets the requirements 
for intentional automaticity in that it occurs for tasks when a minimal amount of numerical 
processing is necessary (Experiment 2) and yet, it must fall somewhere between the two ends 
of the spectrum, as it also occurs for tasks where numerical information is not part of the task 
requirement (Experiments 3 and 5). Indeed, we would argue that the pattern of results 
suggests that the SNARC effect is closer to autonomous than intentional automaticity. 
In a wide-ranging analysis of the nature of automaticity, Moors and De Houwer 
(2006) recommended diagnosing automaticity by examining the presence of its various 
features. There are a number of these that the current studies address. Firstly, we can rule out 
a “purely stimulus driven” account; in Experiment 1 and Experiment 5 (see the 0 ms onset), 
mere exposure to a digit was not sufficient to cause a SNARC effect. However, if we look at 
features that would be classified as “goal-related” (Moors and De Houwer include 
(un)intentional, goal-directed, goal (in)dependent, (un)controlled/(un)controllable, and 
autonomous under this bracket), our results are more consistent with the stronger end of an 
automaticity continuum. Numerical magnitude was not relevant to the task in any of our 




experiments, however numerical status was relevant in Experiment 2 (where the digit had to 
be recognised as a number). We can argue then that the act of recognising a stimulus as a 
number is sufficient to trigger access to numerical magnitude regardless of whether it is 
relevant to the task. Furthermore, the finding of a SNARC effect in Experiment 3 and in 
Experiment 5 (in the 200 ms and 400 ms onset conditions) suggests that numerical status 
itself is not a necessary trigger for the SNARC effect.  
One aspect of automaticity identified by Moors and De Houwer (2006) is that a 
process should be fast. This is relevant for the current studies; while the presence of the 
SNARC effect was not related to reaction time to color onset, it was related in part to the 
length of time for which the participant viewed the digit prior to making a response. So, in 
Experiment 5, the reaction times across the 0 ms, 200 ms and 400 ms conditions from color 
onset were 427 ms (no SNARC effect), 418 ms (SNARC effect) and 420 ms (SNARC effect) 
respectively. However, if we take reaction times from first presentation of the digit, the same 
values are 427 ms, 618 ms, and 820 ms. One might then argue that access to numerical 
magnitude is just relatively slow and was not completed in time to interfere with reaction 
time in the 0 ms condition. However, this cannot be the only account of our effects, as the 
reaction time from digit onset in Experiment 3 were 474 ms, 628 ms, and 819 ms in the 0 ms, 
200 ms, and 400 ms conditions respectively and yet the SNARC effect was comparable 
across the three conditions. Furthermore, we should take into account that Fias et al. (2001) 
pushed color decision reaction times to 490 ms by making the color discrimination more 
difficult and yet still did not find a SNARC effect. 
We believe that Experiment 3’s findings suggest that simply the act of having to 
inhibit a response is a sufficient trigger for the SNARC effect. Indeed, it may be possible to 
account for this pattern of findings using Fias et al.’s (2001) neural overlap account. Fias et 
al. found a SNARC effect for orientation decisions to rotated digits but not color decisions 




and explained their findings according to the extent to which information from visual features 
is processed by the parietal pathway; while orientation depends on the parietal cortex, color 
processing is not thought to substantially rely on these areas (e.g., Chao & Martin, 1999; 
Faillenot, Sunaert, Van Hecke, & Orban, 2001; Murata, Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 
2000). Crucially, the parietal cortex is thought to be activated for coding spatial 
representations of numerical quantity from number digits, number words, and non-symbolic 
displays of dot patterns (e.g., Ansari, Dhital, & Siong, 2006; Cutini, Scarpa, Scatturin, 
Dell’Acqua, & Zorzi, 2014; Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, & Tsivkin, 1999; Eger, 
Sterzer, Russ, Giraud, & Kleinschmidt, 2003; Gebuis, Cohen Kadosh, de Haan, & Henik, 
2009; Piazza, Izard, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004; Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 
2004; see Hubbard et al., 2005; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009 for reviews). As such, Fias et al. 
argued that irrelevant information regarding the magnitude of the digit (and hence its position 
on the mental number line) interfered with processing orientation. Using this logic, one might 
argue that the necessity to inhibit responses on symbol trials in Experiment 2 would recruit 
prefrontal resources, which are part of the circuit recruited for the processing of numerical 
information and ordinal sequences more generally (e.g., van Opstal, Fias, Peigneux, & 
Verguts, 2009). Furthermore, executive control functions (which include inhibition) are 
subserved by multiple neural circuits involving interconnections of the prefrontal cortex with 
striatal and parietal regions (e.g., Edin et al., 2009). In other words, one could argue that the 
temporal uncertainty in Experiment 3, and the requirement to withhold a response until color 
onset in the 200 ms and 400 ms conditions in Experiment 5 could be enough to trigger an 
inhibitory component to the task and so prompt a SNARC effect (note that this explanation is 
also consistent with the SNARC effect for the go / no-go task in Experiment 2).  
In terms of setting the current findings within the broader context of SNARC effects, 
the majority of reported studies use tasks that involve processing of semantic information 




about number. At the extreme end of this are studies that ask people to make magnitude 
decisions (e.g., Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2017), but the parity decision task (probably the 
most commonly used SNARC task) also requires retrieval of semantic information regarding 
the number that is likely to then also trigger access to magnitude. There are fewer studies that 
use tasks where numerical information is entirely irrelevant to the task goal. One example is 
visual detection (Fischer et al., 2003); however, as reported in the Introduction, this was not 
replicated by Zanolie and Pecher (2014) except when magnitude was task-relevant. 
Interestingly, Bulf et al. (2014) used this paradigm and compared symbolic and non-symbolic 
number, finding a SNARC effect for both, but they only used the digits and numerosities 2 
and 9 as stimuli. It is possible that the use of only two numerical magnitudes influenced 
participants’ approach to the task. Further research will be needed to establish whether the 
visual detection paradigm reliably produces SNARC effects; indeed, there is currently a 
multi-lab registered replication ongoing to this effect (Colling & Holcombe, 2017). Another 
example often cited as evidence for the SNARC effect’s automaticity is the phoneme 
monitoring task (Fias et al., 1996). On the face of it, the phoneme monitoring task might 
seem to provide only weak triggers to numerical magnitude; however, the task used involves 
responding to Arabic digits. In other words, in order to report whether or not the digit 
contained the /e/ phoneme, participants had to transcode the stimuli from a visually presented 
digit to a verbal representation of the number, a process that Fias et al. argued was likely to 
involve accessing the semantic number system. In this respect, the phoneme monitoring task 
bears some resemblance to our go / no-go task in Experiment 2; it does not require processing 
of numerical magnitude, but it does require access to numerical information of a sort, and in 
both cases this appears to be sufficient to trigger the SNARC effect. 
Modality dependence of the SNARC effect 




 There was no evidence whatsoever for a SNARC effect for non-symbolic number in 
Experiment 4, and this raises some interesting questions. To our knowledge, the only other 
reported SNARC effects for non-symbolic number when magnitude was irrelevant to the task 
are Mitchell et al. (2012), who reported a SNARC effect for orientation decisions to triangles, 
and Bulf et al. (2014), who used a visual detection task (discussed above). However, in our 
own lab we have failed to replicate the SNARC effect for orientation decisions three times 
(Cleland, Corsico, White & Bull, in prep). In terms of the automaticity of access to 
magnitude and its spatial associations, therefore, the emerging picture appears to be that non-
symbolic number does not provide the same direct and automatic route that symbolic number 
does. 
 In many ways, this is a surprising finding. If digits provide such a direct route to 
magnitude and its spatial associations, then why not non-symbolic number (which, by its very 
nature, provides a more explicit representation of magnitude)? After all, there is strong 
evidence that many animals have a “number sense” of sorts (see e.g., Brannon, 2005, for a 
review) and there is even evidence that some animals have a preference for left-to-right 
orientation of magnitude, including chimpanzees (e.g., Adachi, 2014) and birds (e.g., Rugani, 
Kelly, Szelest, Regolin, & Vallortigara, 2010; Rugani, Vallortigara, Priftis, & Regolin, 2015; 
see Rugani, Vallortigara, & Regolin, 2015, for a review).  
There are a couple of issues that need to be addressed here. The first is that the non-
symbolic stimuli in Experiment 4 contain many non-numerical cues to magnitude that do not 
play a role in digit processing (e.g., individual item area, item spacing, convex hull, total 
surface area). In order to minimise the contribution of non-numerical cues to magnitude, the 
stimuli in Experiment 4 were controlled for aggregate surface area and, so far as possible, the 
area subtended by the stimulus. As a result of this, the surface area of any individual items in 
the 9-circle array would be vastly reduced compared to the surface area of the circle in the 1-




circle array. As such, properties of the stimuli that would usually provide quick and easy 
visual cues to overall number were in fact incongruent with magnitude. There is an increasing 
body of evidence to suggest that these visual cues are important for determining performance 
on numerical processing tasks (see e.g., Gebuis, Cohen Kadosh, & Gevers, 2016; Gebuis & 
Reynvoet, 2012). Furthermore, this appears to hold for tasks with a spatial component; 
Cleland and Bull (2015) reported that participants performing a bisection task to a line 
flanked by numerosities were at least as influenced by subtended area and aggregate surface 
area as they were by number of items (participants performing this task on a line flanked by 
digits will bisect towards the numerically larger digit, e.g., Calabria & Rossetti, 2005; de 
Hevia, Girelli, & Vallar, 2006; Fischer, 2001). However, note that in our own lab, we have 
failed to replicate the finding of a SNARC effect for orientation decisions to triangles even 
when we allow the aggregate surface area of the triangles in the array and the subtended area 
to increase congruently with magnitude (Cleland et al., in prep). As such, even for the 
orientation decision task (which should show a SNARC effect based on the findings of Fias 
et al., 2001) and when all the visual cues are pointing towards increasing magnitude with 
increasing items, we still do not find a SNARC effect. It is therefore particularly surprising 
that Bulf et al. (2014) do report a SNARC effect for the visual detection task, which should 
provide a much weaker trigger to magnitude.  
The second issue is that there is evidence that people are able to automatically extract 
quantity by means of a rapid and accurate subitizing (or “parallel individuation”) process for 
quantities less than five (e.g., Jevons, 1871; Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & Volkmann, 1949; 
Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). Indeed, Mitchell et al. (2012) reported that the SNARC effect was 
strongest in the subitizing range (i.e., when only the 1-4 arrays were considered).  Focussing 
on the subitizing range in Experiment 4 allows us to address both this issue and the issue of 
numerical cues. While the aggregate surface area (i.e., total space occupied by all the 




individual circles not including the spaces between them) was held constant across all 
conditions, the area subtended by the stimulus could only be controlled once there were 
enough items to spread the stimuli sufficiently; in other words, no amount of rearranging two 
circles can make them subtend the same area as nine circles. Therefore, the strongest test of a 
SNARC effect for non-symbolic number was to look at the 1-4 range. We therefore re-ran the 
analysis for the subitizing range only. However, we found no evidence of a SNARC effect 
overall, β = -.136, t (19) =  -1.005, p = .328, d = .225, CI [-.416, .147], BF10 = .363. In fact, 
the SNARC effect was not significant in any of the onset conditions once multiple 
comparisons were taken into account: 0 ms onset, β = -.313, t (19) =  -2.243, p = .037, d = 
.502, CI [-.605, -.021], BF10 = 1.761 (note that the Bayes Factor here suggests only anecdotal 
evidence for the hypothesis); 200 ms onset, β = .046, t (19) =  .317, p = .754, d = .071, CI [-
.257, .348], BF10 = .243; 400 ms, β = -.087, t (19) =  -.746, p = .465, d = .167, CI [-.331, 
.157], BF10 = .298. In other words, even when non-symbolic number should have provided 
the most basic and direct access to magnitude information, we did not observe a SNARC 
effect. 
 So, why does non-symbolic number not trigger a SNARC effect when so many other 
forms of numerical representation do? One possibility relates to the fact that non-symbolic 
representations of number do not offer an easy and direct route to a verbal label, and that a 
verbal label may be necessary to elicit a SNARC effect. Indeed, accounts of the SNARC 
effect often make explicit reference to either verbal labels or coding (see section below). We 
therefore make two predictions for future experiments. The first is that placing people under 
conditions that prevent them from accessing verbal labels should attenuate or eliminate the 
SNARC effect. The second is that asking people to respond to non-symbolic representations 
of number that do have easy verbal labels will induce a SNARC effect; perhaps this explains 
why Bulf et al. (2014) find a SNARC effect for non-symbolic number using only arrays of 




two and nine dots; in this case, there is an easy distinction to be made between “few” and 
“many”.  
Implications for accounts of the SNARC effect 
 Various accounts of the SNARC effect have been proposed, but they can be grouped 
into three categories corresponding to the mental number line account (e.g., Dehaene et al., 
1993), strategic accounts (most notably the working memory account, e.g., van Dijck & Fias, 
2011), and the polarity and conceptual coding accounts (e.g., Gevers, Verguts, Reynvoet, 
Caessens, & Fias, 2006; Proctor & Cho, 2006). 
Dehaene et al. (1993) proposed that the SNARC effect reflected activation of a left-to-
right oriented number magnitude or number line and discussed it within the framework of 
Dehaene’s (1992) triple-code model (cf. e.g., Dehaene & Cohen, 1995; Hubbard et al., 2005). 
They argued that the strong SNARC effect observed for visually displayed digits could be 
attributed to an automatic “Arabic-to-analogue” transcoding process. They observed a 
weakened SNARC effect for verbal numbers and argued that the verbal-to-analogue pathway 
was either less automatic or absent. This “mental number line” account is intuitively 
appealing, and is arguably the dominant framework within which SNARC effects are 
discussed in the literature. However, the pattern of positive and negative SNARC findings 
across the current experiments (and the wider literature) suggests that the mechanisms 
underlying the SNARC effect must be somewhat more complex than a straightforward 
automatic transcoding process. 
Under strategic accounts of the SNARC effect, most notably the working memory 
account, visuo-spatial associations are short- rather than long-term and built during task 
execution (e.g., Fias, van Dijck, & Gevers, 2011; Fischer, 2006; Fischer, Mills, & Shaki, 
2010; van Dijck & Fias, 2011; see Fias & van Dijck, 2016 for a review). These accounts are 
based on findings which demonstrate that there are spatial associations with ordinal 




information in working memory. For example, van Dijck and Fias (2011) showed that items 
presented at the beginning of a verbal working memory sequence were responded to faster 
and more accurately with the left hand than the right hand, whereas items presented towards 
the end were responded to faster and more accurately with the right hand. This effect 
occurred for both numerical and non-numerical stimuli (specifically, lists of fruit and 
vegetables, which we would not expect to have long-term spatial associations). On the basis 
of this finding, Van Dijck and Fias argued that participants performing a SNARC task encode 
the numbers presented during the experiment in working memory into a task-set that stores 
both the stimuli presented and the responses required (this being a strategy to aid task 
execution). The spatial association whereby small is associated with left and large with right 
arises because participants make use of the existing ordinal properties of number so that (e.g.) 
1 precedes 2, which precedes 3, and so on. The SNARC effect reflects this temporary ordinal 
information.  
The fact that the SNARC effect was inconsistent across different tasks in our study 
should, in theory, favour strategic accounts. For example, the lack of an effect in the non-
symbolic task could simply be attributed to the fact that participants have no quick and easy 
verbal labels for the arrays of circles presented (at least, the arrays do not provide the quick 
and direct route to a verbal label that digits do). As such, they are less likely to be coded in 
working memory in an ordinal fashion. One could also argue that participants do not 
construct a task-set for simple color decision to a digit (i.e., Experiment 1 and the 0 ms 
condition in Experiment 5) because the task is so easy. However, an issue for the working 
memory hypothesis is the fact that the SNARC effect did not occur for the 0 ms onset 
condition in Experiment 5, regardless of whether it was the first, second or third block of the 
experiment. When the 200 ms or 400 ms block occurred first, under the Working Memory 
account, participants must have constructed a spatial coding during task execution that led to 




the SNARC effect in those blocks. What is unclear is why such a spatial coding would then 
be abandoned for the subsequent 0 ms block.  
Under Proctor and Cho’s (2006) polarity account, differences in performance on a 
given task are driven by the coding of response alternatives as having positive or negative 
polarity along different dimensions; when there is polarity correspondence, then responses 
are faster. In the case of the SNARC effect specifically, a correspondence between magnitude 
polarity (large number +, small number - ) with that of response polarity (right +, left - ) 
drives the effect rather than any long-term spatial representations of number. It is not 
immediately clear how this account would fit with the mixed pattern of effects for color 
decision across the different tasks in the current studies, but Gevers, Verguts, Reynvoet, 
Caessens and Fias’s (2006) provide a well-specified computational conceptual coding 
account that does allow us to make more detailed predictions.  
We would classify Gevers et al.’s (2006) computational model of the SNARC effect 
as a conceptual coding account, although it contains elements of the mental number line 
account as well. The model consists of three layers. Firstly, there is a bottom layer that 
represents the mental number line, with a number field (consisting of nodes for each number) 
and a standard field (a task dependent field that codes for the qualities of the digit relevant for 
the task). The second layer consists of a magnitude field (it is assumed that the number is 
always coded as small or large, regardless of the task), and additional fields that are activated 
dependent on the task (for example, a parity field that contains nodes for “even” and “odd”). 
In our study therefore, we would expect there to be a color field, with one node for blue and 
another for green. This middle layer receives input from both the number field and the 
standard field. For example, a blue “9” in our task would always activate the “large” node in 
the Magnitude field, and the “blue” response in the Color field. A final top layer contains 
nodes for left and right hands that are connected by lateral inhibition. These receive 




activation from both the Magnitude field and the relevant task field. Once one of these nodes 
reaches a fixed threshold, the corresponding response can be initiated. To take an example 
from our task, consider a blue digit “9” when blue responses are mapped to the left hand. At 
the middle layer, the “Larger” node in the Magnitude field is activated and inputs activation 
to the “Right hand” node in the top layer. However, the number field activates the “Blue” 
(corresponding to left) node for the color field in the middle layer and spreads activation to 
the “Left hand” node at the top layer. Thus, the Magnitude field activates the “Right hand” 
node, and the task-specific Color field activates the “Left hand” field, they inhibit one another 
and it takes some time for the “Left hand” to reach the threshold level before the response can 
be executed. This could be compared with a trial where the digit “1” appears in blue; in this 
case both the Magnitude and the Color field activate the “Left hand” field at the top layer and 
this quickly reaches threshold. 
Crucially, this model predicts that the SNARC effect should increase with time; in 
their implementation of the model, Gevers et al. (2006) found that the slope of the SNARC 
effect became larger in slower conditions. In our studies, the presence or absence of the 
SNARC effect was not related to reaction time to color onset; however, as noted above, it 
was related to the length of time for which the participant viewed the digit prior to making a 
response. We believe that this could be consistent with Gevers et al.’s model if we assume 
that longer viewing time means more activation from the Magnitude field. The Magnitude 
field will be activated as soon as the digit is presented, while the Color field will not be 
activated until color onset. As such, on incongruent trials, the incorrect response at the top 
layer will be activated and inhibiting the correct response before the Color field has received 
input from the Number field; as a result it will take longer for the correct response to reach 
the threshold level. In contrast, on congruent trials, the correct response will already be 
activated at the top layer by the time the Color field provides its input and so it can rapidly 




reach the threshold level. We would therefore argue that the current findings are most 
consistent with this computational model. 
Conclusion 
Treisman, Vieira and Hayes (1992) wrote that “Perhaps we should think of 
[automaticity] like a medical syndrome with a set of symptoms: The more you have, the more 
fully automatized you are” (p. 341). Following this train of thought, we would argue that the 
SNARC effect has a serious case of automaticity; so far as digit processing is concerned, it is 
much easier to find a task that does trigger access to magnitude and its spatial associations 
than it is to find a task that does not. In the current series of studies we took one of the few 
tasks that has been reported not to show a SNARC effect (i.e., color decision) and found that 
even minor adjustments to the task conditions (i.e., a longer presentation time, temporal 
uncertainty, recognising the stimulus as a digit) were enough to trigger the effect. In other 
words, numerical magnitude and its spatial associations are accessed very readily upon 
presentation of a digit, with little additional triggering required. Conversely, we found no 
evidence whatsoever for a SNARC effect to non-symbolic representations of number, 
suggesting that, at the least, the SNARC effect for non-symbolic number lies very much at 
the opposite end of the automaticity continuum. Our findings are most supportive of 
conceptual coding accounts of the SNARC effect (e.g., Gevers et al., 2006). 
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